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April 2010 
 
 ON THE QUESTION OF A COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION TO THE  
 SEVENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE OF TRIAL BY JURY 
 
 
 
 
by James Oldham 
Georgetown Law 
 
 
The first clause of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution is 
deceptively simple. It reads: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”  But a moment=s reflection 
prompts the question, “What right to trial by jury?”  Justice Story responded in 1812 in the case 
of United States v. Wonson, in which he stated: “Beyond all question, the common law here 
alluded to is not the common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is 
the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”1  Justice Story=s 
interpretation of the language of the first clause of the Seventh Amendment became the standard 
guideline for the scope of the Seventh Amendment=s trial by jury guarantee, and it remains so 
today.  It has come to be called “the historical test,” and an oft-quoted description of the test by 
the Supreme Court in the 1935 decision of Dimick v. Schiedt is as follows: “In order to ascertain 
the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of 
the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 
1791.”2  The applications of this test by the federal courts over the years since its formulation 
 
1 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812). 
   
2 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).  
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have been the subject of extensive academic scholarship, including my own.3 
One important and as yet unanswered question is whether jury trial is required by the 
Seventh Amendment in complex civil litigation.  That question was posed in a case before the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1980, In re Japanese Electronic Products 
Litigation,4 but after studying competing briefs by legal historians Morris Arnold and Patrick 
Devlin, the court demurred, choosing “not to pioneer in this use of history.”5 
In my own writing, I have concluded that a Acomplexity exception@ to the Seventh 
Amendment would be legitimate under the historical test.6  Among other things, I have pointed 
out two fundamental features of late 18th century business litigation in EnglandBthe frequent 
referral of such cases to arbitration, and, for cases litigated to a conclusion, the strong likelihood 
that such cases would be put before a special jury of merchants.7 These major differences 
between the English jury-trial practices of 1791 and jury practices in 21st-century America have 
not been recognized by the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts in applications of the 
Seventh Amendment=s historical test.  Yet if we believe that the founders meant to preserve in 
the United States the realistic operational features of trial by jury as practiced in England at the 
time the Seventh Amendment was adopted, these realities ought to be recognized.   
 
3 See J. Oldham, Trial by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and Anglo-American Special 
Juries (cited hereafter as Trial by Jury) (2006), in particular chapter one (“The Scope of the 
Seventh Amendment Guarantee”) and sources cited therein.   
 
4 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) 
 
5 Ibid., 1083.   
 
6 See Trial by Jury, ch. 2. 
   
7 Ibid., 22-23. 
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The fundamental inquiry in thinking about the possibility of a complexity exception to 
the Seventh Amendment is how the courts should deal with cases that demand expertise in the 
decision-makers in coping with complicated facts.  The Supreme Court in the Dimick case 
instructed that “resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established at the 
time of the adoption of [the Seventh Amendment] in 1791.”8 One of the rules of the common 
law of 1791 in England was the availability of a special jury, as of right, on demand by either 
party in a civil case.9  This immediately presents a problem.  Even though special juries were 
used extensively in the United States in earlier times, their use in federal courts has become 
unlawful as a result of the statutory rule that jury pools must reflect a reasonable cross-section of 
the society from which the jury pool is drawn.10  
In the discussion to follow, I expand my inquiry into what happened in the English courts 
of the late 18th and early 19th centuries in civil cases when special expertise on the part of the 
decision-makers was needed.  A major source that contributes to this study is the law reporting 
that appeared in The Times, founded in 1785.11  I explore three questions: (1) What types of 
cases in late 18th-century England were considered to be inappropriate for juries? (2) What 
recourses were available to the late 18th or early 19th-century English judge when the issue in a 
case was outside his own expertise or beyond his individual capability?  (3) What exactly was 
the role of merchant jurors in putting their mercantile expertise to work in a given case?   
 
8 293 F.2d at 476.   
 
9 See Trial by Jury, 22.  
 
10 Ibid., 204.  
  
11 Originally known as the Daily Universal Register, the entire run of The Times is 
available on line.   
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 What Types of Cases in Late 18th Century England Were Considered 
 Inappropriate for Juries?  
 
Some complicated business litigation in England in the late 18th century never reached a 
jury.  Some such cases were not “suits at common law” but were suits in equity in the Court of 
Chancery, where there were no juries.  The fundamental task of the Court of Chancery in these 
cases was fact-finding, even though fact-finding is normally thought of as an exclusive jury 
function.  The most common example of this type of case was the suit in which the plaintiff 
sought an accounting, for example in activities of a partnership or in a bankruptcy proceeding.  
Such a case would ordinarily be referred to one of the twelve Masters in Chancery to work out 
the accounts.12  In the 1794 case of Barnard v. Assignees of Price, however, the Master in 
Chancery balked.  The plaintiff had initially filed in the Court of Chancery seeking an accounting 
from the assignees of Price, who had become bankrupt.  At the plaintiff=s request, the case was 
referred to a Master in Chancery, but to everyone’s surprise, the Master, in turn, referred the case 
to the Court of King’s Bench for the verdict of a jury “on the state of this long and complicated 
account.”13  The case was presented to Chief Justice Kenyon and a special jury of merchants on 
December 18, 1794 by two of the leading barristers of the day, William Garrow and Thomas 
Erskine.  Garrow said that “the case consisted of such volumes of paper, that he should have no 
difficulty to say, without danger of being contradicted, that it was absolutely impossible for a 
Court and a Jury to decide that cause.”  He said that if it had originated in a court of law, “it 
would have been considered as one of those causes, which, from unavoidable necessity, must be 
referred to arbitration.”  Garrow, therefore, suggested to Erskine that they should send the case to 
 
12 See the discussion of the Blad and Clench cases, Trial by Jury, 18. 
13 The Times, December 19, 1794, p. 3.  
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arbitration. Erskine said that “he should as soon attempt to describe the essence of the celestial or 
infernal spirits, as endeavour to describe what passed in the Master=s office,” but “he had no 
objection to refer it, provided they could get some gentleman (who must be a young man) to 
devote the remainder of his days to this business.” In the end, Garrow and Erskine agreed to refer 
the case to (young) barristers George Holroyd and John Bayley, and Lord Kenyon said “it could 
not be in better hands; and the verdict would be entered up, as the arbitrators should direct.”14 
 Other disputes requiring sophisticated fact-finding originated in Chancery and ended up 
in arbitration, as in Gyles v. Wilcox, a copyright infringement dispute in which the plaintiff 
sought injunctive relief,15  Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said that, “The court is not under an 
indispensable obligation to send all facts to a jury, but may refer them to a Master, to state them, 
where it is a question of nicety and difficulty, and more fit for men of learning to inquire into, 
than a common jury.” He added that, AThe House of Lords very often, in matters of account 
which are extremely perplexed and intricate, refer it to two merchants named by the parties, to 
consider the case, and report their opinions on it, rather than leave it to a jury.”16 Barnardiston, in 
his report of the case, quotes Hardwicke as saying that Awhere the facts are of an extensive 
nature, as matters of accounts, or the like,” the court might direct “that the Master should be 
attended by two Persons skilled in the Profession of the Law, to assist him,” and “Directions of 
 
14 Ibid. (in the news account, Bayley is spelled Baillie.)  For a case with a comparable 
outcome, see the brief report of Handy v. Camden, The Times, August 16, 1787.  Counsel for the 
plaintiff said “he must go through accounts to upwards of 10,000, and he thought it would have 
been proper to have brought their night-caps, unless they chose to refer it.”  The parties chose to 
refer it to a Mr. Norris of the Sun Fire Office. 
 
15 2 Atk. 141; Barn. C. 368 (Ch. 1740), discussed at Trial by Jury, 19-21.  
 
16 2 Atk. 144. 
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this Sort have been made in Mathematical and Algebraical Inquiries.”17  In the end, the Gyles 
case was referred to arbitration.18 
It was open to the Court of Chancery in complex cases to work the case to a conclusion 
without referring it to arbitration.  An example from the 19th century is the case of Short v. Lee.19  
There, a lessee of an ecclesiastical corporation sued in Chancery for tithes, and on being urged to 
send an issue to the law courts, the Master of the Rolls (Sir Thomas Plummer) said that the 
evidence to disprove the immemorial existence of the tithes was Aentirely written, contained in 
thirty-six ancient rolls in a dead language, embracing many terms of different kinds” – “their 
construction has called forth the applications of learning, critical and accurate investigation and 
collation, frequent and useful revision, and the assistance of glossaries and antiquarian 
knowledge, to form a correct judgment respecting their meaning and import.”  He then asked, 
rhetorically, ACould this be done before a jury at Nisi Prius, with the same effect as it may in a 
court, assisted by the learning and industry of the bar, during a hearing of many days, devoted 
entirely to this one subject, and with a knowledge of the whole of the cause to which the enquiry 
belongs?@20  
Apart from demands for an accounting or esoteric cases such as Short v. Lee, it must be 
acknowledged that most non-criminal cases -- even those that were factually complex --B would 
have been filed in the common law courts in the late 18th century.  These would have been put on 
 
17 Barn. C. 368.   
 
18 See 3 Atk. 269 (1745). 
 
19 2 Jac. & W. 464 (1821).  
 
20 Ibid., 502. 
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the nisi prius dockets in London or on the assizes.  If it was clear from the start in such a case 
that special expertise would be required to understand and resolve complex facts, the plaintiff 
would request (as of right) a special jury, which by custom in mercantile cases would be made up 
entirely or predominantly by merchants.21   
If the case were beyond the capability of a jury -- even a special jury -- two alternatives 
might be available: To refer the case to arbitration or to file a demurrer to the evidence.  It was 
even possible for a special jury to confess its own inability.  A brief newspaper account of the 
Suffolk assizes at Bury St. Edmunds in August 1791 described a special jury case involving 
canal construction between Ipswich and Stowmarket, and according to The Times:  
“After getting a little way into the cause, and the Jury confessing themselves not 
competent to decide on the skill or merits of canal-cutting, nor of the value of 
materials, nor of their use or necessity, and not much elucidation being expressed 
from either the Bar or the Bench on such a subject, the parties agreed to refer the 
matters in dispute to a gentleman of skill and experience in this branch of business.”22 
References to arbitration were, of course, consensual, so that in theory there was a right 
to insist on trial by jury despite recommendations from the court and opposing counsel to refer 
the case.  But whether this theoretical right was meaningful in practice can be questioned.  In 
Bennett v. Leader, for example, Lord Eldon, newly appointed Chief Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas, “took an extraordinary degree of pains” to coax the defendant to refer a case 
involving a conveyancer’s bill.  Eldon explained that “he had never seen a conveyancer’s bill in 
his life, that probably the Gentlemen of the Jury were nearly in the same situation, and that, 
therefore, all that they could do would be to form a sort of guess as to the value of the work,” 
 
21 See text accompanying nn. 41-45, below. 
 
22 The Times, August 18, 1791, p. 4. 
 
 
 8 
                                                
whereas a fair and reasonable outcome could be expected by a reference to a respected 
gentlemen “who was acquainted with that branch of the profession.”  Eldon added that if the 
defendant insisted that the case be tried, they would do the best they could.  The defendant 
capitulated, and the case was referred to Mr. Wilson.23 
Avoiding a jury by the demurrer to the evidence can best be illustrated by a set of cases 
during 1788-91 involving an interconnected series of bankruptcies precipitated by the failure of 
an extremely large and influential cotton manufacturer, Livesey & Co.  Collectively these cases 
involved millions of pounds sterling.  The transactions were multi-layered and complex.  All of 
the cases required the courts to consider the legitimacy of a suspect financial device -- the use of 
fictitious payees in accommodation paper, principally bills of exchange.  It is not necessary for 
purposes of the present article to explore the intricacies of these financial dealings,24 but the 
legal strategy of counsel for the defendants, Thomas Erskine, is relevant.  The case of Vere and 
Williams v. Assignees of Lewis and Porter began in Chancery as a petition by Gibson and 
Johnson to prove securities worth at least ,170,000 under the bankruptcy commission of Lewis 
and Porter.25  At a hearing on November 22, 1788, Lord Chancellor Thurlow said the case was 
“of the first importance.”  Although “it appeared to be discoloured by the grossest fraud,” it 
would depend on factual proof that could not be developed in Chancery.  He therefore directed a 
trial at law, but as an intermediate step, he referred the case to the Master in Chancery “to 
 
23 The Times, December 17, 1799, p. 4. 
 
24 The leading case was Minet v. Gibson and Johnson, 3 T.R. 481 (1789), 1 H. Bl. 569 
(1791), which went all the way to the House of Lords, where the use of the fictitious payee was 
upheld.  For a useful summary, see J.K. Horsefield, “Gibson and Johnson: a Forgotten Cause 
Celebre,” Economica, New Series 10 (1943): 233. 
 
25 See The Times, November 26, 1788, p. 3. 
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examine all the books of account . . . in order to ascertain the real state of the transactions.”  A 
month later, the case came on in the Court of King’s Bench before Lord Kenyon and “a very 
respectable special jury of merchants.”26  According to the newspaper report of the case, Erskine 
politely acknowledged that the Lord Chancellor “doubtless felt the necessity of its being 
determined according to the strict rule of the common law,” but then said, Athat although he 
entertained the highest opinion of the judgment of a Jury of merchants upon all commercial 
questions, yet such was the magnitude of the present [case], that he felt it his duty to demur to 
the evidence, for the purpose of having the case investigated, and the law laid down upon it by 
the Court.” 
Demurrers to the evidence were also filed by Erskine on behalf of the defendants in the 
next case in the series, Tatlock v. Harris,27 and in at least four subsequent cases.28  In Gosling v. 
Harris, Erskine explained his demurrer to the evidence by observing that no part of the 
discussion of the fictitious payee question “belonged to the Jury, being a question of a great deal 
of legal intricacy.”  According to The Times, “The effect of this was, to take it from the 
consideration of the Jury, and to bring it before the court of King’s Bench for their 
 
26 The Times, December 23, 1788, p. 4. 
27 3 T.R. 174 (1789), also reported in The Times, May 11, 1789, p. 3. 
 
28 Hunter v. Gibson and Johnson; Williams v. Gibson and Johnson; Master and Co. v. 
Gibson and Johnson, all reported at The Times December 19, 1791, p. 3; and Gosling and Co. v. 
Gibson and Johnson, The Times, December 30, 1791.  The earlier Minet case was sent by Lord 
Chancellor Thurlow to the Court of King’s Bench with a directive that it be tried by a special 
jury.  See The Times, November 5, 1789, p. 4, and see Trial by Jury at 156 on such directives 
from Chancery.  The special jury, in turn, issued a special verdict “in order that the record might 
be carried forward to the House of Lords.”  3 T.R. at 483, n. (a).  (The report of the House of 
Lords case in Henry Blackstone=s Reports, folio edition, occupies 56 pages.) 
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determination.”@29 And in Hunter v. Gibson and Johnson, Erskine, referring to opposing counsel  
Bearcroft, queried, “How, says my learned friend, can I venerate the Trial by Jury, when I wish 
to withdraw facts from their consideration?”30 Erskine responded:  
    “I respect the Trial by Jury, because it is a part of the Constitution of the country, 
and therefore entitled to my respect, but the same Constitution which nurtured the  
Trial by Jury instituted also a demurrer to evidence, and therefore both of these, 
as parts of one harmonious whole, are equally respectable.”31 
 
 What Choices Were Available to the Late 18th Century or Early 19th Century 
 English Judge When an Issue Was Outside His Own Expertise, Beyond 
 His Own Capability, or So Important That Others Should be Consulted? 
 
As we have seen, there were times during jury trials being conducted at nisi prius or on 
assize when the trial judge sought collegial or expert help. Not infrequently a legal question 
 
29 The Times,  
 
30 The Times, December 19, 1791, p. 3. 
 
31 Ibid.  The fictitious payee cases continued to occupy the courts beyond 1791, as shown 
by a report in The Times of a new trial on July 6, 1793 of Hunter v. Gibson and Johnson, before a 
special jury, with Bearcroft for the plaintiff, Erskine for the defendant.  Bearcroft opened by 
referring to the numerous cases that had been in litigation for many years involving Amany 
hundred thousand pounds,” remarking that as a result, the phrase “payable to a fictitious payee” 
had become “Aperfectly understood.”  In the course of the proceeding, Chief Justice Kenyon 
observed that Erskine Amight tender a Bill of Exceptions if he objected to any part of the evidence 
that might be produced.”  Erskine Athanked his Lordship for that indulgence,” and later tendered 
a bill of exceptions “as to the general course of the trade between these parties,” claiming that 
such evidence had no bearing on the specific bill of exchange that was before the court.  The 
Times, July 9, 1793, p. 3.  In doing so, Erskine “begged it might be understood that by this bill of 
exceptions, he meant no disrespect to the jury, who most undoubtedly were quite respectable,” 
explaining that “The Jury were the judges of the fact, but they were not judges of what facts 
ought to be laid before them.”  Lord Kenyon, addressing the jury, said that the fictitious payee 
bills had been before different courts for several years, and despite efforts to use the best means 
to sort out these intricate proceedings, “It had been found that demurring to the evidence was not 
the best mode of arriving at the justice of the case.”  He hoped that the bill of exceptions Awould 
be better suited to that end.”  The jury found for the plaintiff, “subject to the judgment that might 
be given on the bill of exceptions.”  (I have been unable to find a record of the resolution of the 
bill of exceptions.) 
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would arise that called for formal argument before the full four-judge court.  One procedure was 
to convert the case into a special verdict, which would be taken to the full four-judge court 
during the next term.  The factual findings by the jury reflected in the special verdict would then 
be assessed, and after argument of counsel, judgment would be given.32  This, however, was 
time-consuming and expensive because of the procedural steps and filings that were required.33  
A simpler alternative that had by the late 18th century become commonplace was to take the jury 
verdict at trial subject to a “case stated.”  The legal question would be agreed upon by counsel at 
the trial and would be forwarded in writing to the full court.  The jury verdict would either be 
 
32 Many examples could be given of cases in which counsel accepted the trial judge=s 
request or recommendation to convert to a special verdict in order to have a difficult question 
taken up by the full court.  In Clark v. Ewen, the plaintiffs sued to collect insurance on their 
interest in a Danish ship that was damaged on its journey from Bengal to Copenhagen, and when 
a question arose about Danish law, Lord Kenyon said that it would be impossible for him to state 
what the applicable Danish law was, and “he wished a special verdict to be given on the 
occasion, and he should agree that the law of Denmark on this subject should be added to the 
special verdict.”  The Times, October 28, 1788, p. 4, reporting on a trial at Guildhall before 
Kenyon and a special jury held on July 5, 1788.  In R. v. Picton, the defendant was convicted in 
one of the island colonies of having inflicted torture on Louisa Calderon, an accomplice in a 
robbery.  Counsel for the defendant argued that the island was governed by the law of AOld 
Spain,@ under which Aslight torture@ was permitted.  The case was stopped at the suggestion of 
the presiding judge, Lord Ellenborough, so that a special verdict could be prepared.  The Times, 
April 28, 1806, p. 3.  And in Price v. Bell, 1 East 663, 671 (1801), a dispute involving French 
ordinances and a treaty between France and America “was turned into a special verdict by the 
desire of the Court, who thought the question raised . . . of great magnitude.”   
 
In addition to providing an opportunity for research and argument on difficult questions 
that arose at trial, the special verdict had the advantage of putting the facts on the record and 
positioning the case to be carried forward by writ of error if desired.  In Henley v. Wood, for 
example, a case from the Cornwall assizes, the trial judge (Justice Holroyd) “entertained a strong 
opinion that the instrument upon which the ejectment had been brought would not support the 
action, and expressed his wish that the facts should therefore be put in the record, in the shape of 
a special verdict, in order that the question might undergo the consideration of the Court, and be 
ultimately brought for the final determination before the House of Lords if either party should 
think fit.”  The Times, March 31, 1818, p. 3. 
 
33 See, e.g., H. Cary, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Juries at Nisi Prius (1826) 116. 
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upheld or overturned according to the judgment of the full court after argument on the reserved 
legal question.34 If the jury verdict were overturned, a new trial would be necessary.  
A third alternative was to reserve a question for deliberation by all twelve judges at an 
“off-the-record” meeting that might or might not be accompanied by argument of counsel and 
that might or might not become part of a public record.  This procedure was commonly used in 
criminal cases tried at the Old Bailey or on assize.  It was also invoked in civil cases, although 
infrequently.35 
On difficult factual questions, a fourth option was available.  The trial judge in some 
types of cases could arrange to have experts on the bench with him during the trial to give advice 
as needed.  This was done, for example, in marine insurance cases by seeking the help of 
Aassessors,@ retired sea captains and others who were experts on navigation.36   
In complex or sophisticated business disputes a fifth informal option was for the trial 
judge, after ordering a new trial, to consult men of business himself before the new trial came 
on.37  A sixth option was for the judge, either at the initial trial or during a new trial, to rely upon 
 
34 For more detail on this procedure, see J. Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of 
Mansfield (2004): 29, n.65; 52-53. 
35 For the full story of this informal procedure, see J. Oldham, “Informal Law-Making In 
England by the Twelve Judges in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries,” forthcoming, Law and 
History Review. 
 
36 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Commissioners of the Navy, 501 nb 117 (London, 7 March 
1785), in J. Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the 
Eighteenth Century, 2 vols. (1992) (hereafter AMMSS@) I: 392; Casey v. Donald, sittings before 
Lord Kenyon and a special jury of merchants, The Times, December 18, 1799, p.3. 
 
37 In Vallezjo (Vallejo) v. Wheeler, Lofft 631, 644 (1774), the meaning of the word 
Abarratry@ as used in the standard Lloyd=s insurance policy was before the Court of King=s Bench, 
and in delivering the court=s opinion, Lord Mansfield stated: “As it was a matter of a commercial 
nature, and turned greatly upon the usage and custom of merchants, I consulted an eminent 
merchant of whose skill and experience I have a great opinion.”  And in  Medcalf v. Hall, 3 
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the expertise of merchant jurors. Of special relevance to the present study of the Seventh 
Amendment is this sixth optionBreliance by the court upon knowledgeable merchant jurors.   
 The Role of Merchant Jurors 
Preliminarily we should repeat the familiar notion that questions of law were for the 
court; questions of fact for the jury.  This division of responsibility was usually observed, but 
there were times when the merchant jurors disagreed with the court=s view of what conclusion 
should be drawn from the facts that had been proved.  When this happened, the court was in 
something of a quandary.  The court could order a new trial, but if a second jury agreed with the 
first, should the court order a third new trial? In Cambden v. Anderson,38 the ship Active was sent 
with a load of convicted felons to Botany Bay, with permission to bring back a cargo of cotton. 
The cotton was insured, and after the ship was lost on its return trip, suit was brought to collect 
on the policy.  Before becoming lost, the ship had stopped at Goa, and the question was whether 
this was a deviation that voided the policy.  Lord Kenyon thought it was a deviation and so 
instructed the jury, but the special jury of merchants thought otherwise and found for the 
plaintiffs.  Two new trials were held, with the same result.  On July 28, 1794, a fourth trial was 
conducted, and Lord Kenyon apologized to the jury, saying that “he was not vain enough to put 
up his opinion in opposition to that of three juries,” but he was obliged to give them his honest 
 
Doug. 113 (1782), Lord Mansfield stated, after argument on the motion for new trial, “I have 
taken some trouble in informing myself as to the sense of mankind upon it, [and] all the 
merchants I have talked to are against the verdict and I am told the majority of the Bankers are so 
likewise.”  MMSS. 1:158, citing Hill MSS. 18, Fol. 16, Lincoln=s Inn Library, London.  
Although Mansfield did not hesitate to consult the merchants, he was not the first common law 
judge to do so.  Chief Justice Holt did so, for example, during his time as chief justice of King’s 
Bench. See generally Dèirdre M. Dywer, “Expert Evidence in the English Civil Courts, 1550-
1800,” Journal of Legal History 28 (2007): 93, 98.  
38 The Times, October 2, 1794, reporting on sittings before Chief Justice Kenyon and a  
special jury of merchants, July 28, 1794.   
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opinion.  He did so, explaining his reasoning, but the fourth jury again found a verdict for the 
plaintiffs, assessing damages of ,478.39  
It was extremely unusual, however, for there to be such tension between the courts and 
special juries. Ordinarily special juries cooperatively assisted the judges with complex business 
questions in a variety of ways, depending upon who the special jurors were, the nature of the 
issue or issues, and what evidence was presented.  As the eighteenth century unfolded, many 
disputes arose about legal aspects of mercantile transactions.  Frequently the merchants followed 
well-established customs that were new to the courts but that could sensibly be absorbed into the 
common law.  As is well known, Lord Mansfield encouraged this process, working compatibly 
with special juries.40 
Even though there was a legal right to a special jury on request, there was no legal right 
to a special jury of merchants.41  Merchant juries were nevertheless used extensively with the 
consent of both parties, or at least by request of one side with no objection from the other.  
 
39 As I have discussed in prior writing, Lord Mansfield had a similar, though for him rare, 
encounter with special juries in dealing with the question of what was a reasonable time after 
receipt for merchants to deliver drafts to their banks for payment. See the discussion of Medcalf 
v. Hall, Appleton v. Sweetapple, and Tindal v. Brown, Trial by Jury, 37-39; also cases discussed, 
ibid., 162-63.   The question of whether action required to protect one=s right to property was 
taken within a reasonable time has vexed the courts for centuries.  Sometimes the question of 
reasonableness of time has been considered purely a question of fact (see, e.g., the report of 
Bischaft v. Agar, Guildhall sittings before Lord Kenyon and a special jury of merchants, The 
Times, October 4, 1797, p. 4), sometimes a mixed question of law and fact (see Lord Mansfield=s 
opinion in Tindal v. Brown, 1 T.R. 167, 168-69 (1786)), and sometimes a pure question of law 
(see Justice Buller=s opinion in the Tindal case, ibid., 169). See also Lord Kenyon=s comments in 
Burnett v. Kensington, text at nn. 61-62, below, and see generally Stephen A. Weiner, “The Civil 
Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction,” California Law Review 54 (1966): 1867. 
 
40 See generally MMSS I:93-97. 
 
41 Ibid., 95. 
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Separate lists of potential merchant jurors were undoubtedly kept, especially in the City of 
London, where the bulk of commercial litigation took place.42 The lists may not have been long; 
according to The Times, May 30, 1794:   
“Many complaints have been made of the present practice of empaneling Special Juries 
to try causes in the Courts of Law at Westminster, for though the metropolis is of such 
extent, yet the same faces are constantly to be seen on trials.  This makes it necessary, 
that the books of the office where the Juries are struck, should be revised, and the Clerks 
of Nisi Prius examined on this business.  If the latter shall have the power, on questioning 
the verdicts given by Jurymen, to prevent their being summoned in future, it requires 
correction.”43  
 
Complaints notwithstanding, clearly the merchants acted multiple parts throughout the 
late 18th and early 19th centuries in the common law courts in educating the judges about 
mercantile matters.  Sometimes the merchants were special jurors, sometimes they were 
witnesses about customs of merchants or usages of trade, sometimes they were out-of-court 
advisers,44 and sometimes they were arbitrators.45 
 
42 See Trial by Jury at 154-55.  According to Lord Ellenborough: “The law does not 
absolutely require that the jurors be merchants, but the practice certainly has been within the City 
of London to take such only as came within that description.”  Rex v. Wooler, 1 Barn. & Ald. 
193, 203 (1817).  
 
43 The Times, May 30, 1794, p. 3. See also the editorial from the Craftsman in 1771, 
quoted at Trial by Jury, 166.  It was even possible for parties to secure some number of known, 
preferred men on special juries.  Among Sir John Baker=s private collection of manuscripts 
(designated “JHB MSS”) is correspondence between Creswell Pigot, an attorney of Market 
Drayton, Salop, and his London agents, Messrs Benbow & Alban, attorneys of Lincoln=s Inn.  In 
a letter to Pigot of 22 July 1819 concerning a pending lawsuit, Sutton v. Ridgeway, Messrs 
Benbow and Alban wrote that, “We have not yet received another appointment to strike a special 
jury and suppose therefore the sheriff has not yet sent up the freeholders= book.”  This was 
followed by another letter on 2 August stating that, “We have reduced the special jury and have 
got our old acquaintances Aaron Moody and Mr. Hanning,” adding that Hanning had previously 
told Mr. Alban at an inn of his favorable views on the key issue in the pending case.  JHB MS 
924.3(vii), cited and quoted with permission. 
 
44 See n. 36 above, and accompanying text. 
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Introducing evidence of the customs of merchants was not always a simple matter, as is 
shown by the case of Macklish v. Ekins, tried before a King’s Bench jury in 1752 and argued to 
the full court in Hilary term 1753.46  Macklish was the Scottish owner of a ship that had been let 
to the Commissioners of the Navy.  He relied on his London agent, John Todd, giving Todd a 
letter of attorney that authorized him to transact business with the Commissioners.  Todd 
obtained a ,1200 bill from the Commissioners, which Todd then pawned and later authorized to 
be sold at fair market value to a third party, who in turn sold it to Ekins, the defendant, also at 
market value.  Four years later, Macklish brought a trover action against Ekins to recover the 
Navy bill.  A special verdict was rendered, subject to a question referred to the Court of King’s 
Bench, “whether Todd had an authority either to pawn or sell the Navy bill.”47  The court (Lee, 
Chief Justice) applied the maxim caveat emptor and held for the plaintiff.  The defendant then 
brought an action in the Court of Chancery requesting an injunction against enforcement of the 
King’s Bench judgment.48  Lord Chancellor Hardwicke granted the injunction.  He thought the 
case of “great consequence . . . to transacting money in the public funds.”49  According to a 
manuscript report of the case, Hardwicke explained that, “As to the usage, a difference was taken 
at law between admitting evidence of the custom of merchants in transactions of this nature” and 
admitting such evidence “in respect of a legal instrument.”  Hardwicke surmised that, “The Court 
 
45 See, e.g., MMSS I:94 and the discussion there of the multiple roles of Thomas 
Gorman, an expert on insurance.   
 
46 Sayer 73 (1753). 
 
47 Ibid. 
 
48 Ambler 184 (1753). 
 
49 Ibid. 
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of King’s Bench might be of opinion that it [the letter of attorney] was a legal instrument,” but 
he pointed out that policies of insurance were legal instruments, and “unless evidence be 
admitted on policies of insurance, they would be unintelligible.”50 
Lord Hardwicke said that “evidence of usage and custom as to these transactions ought to 
be admitted and is very material,”51 and according to Ambler=s report, Hardwicke observed that,  
“Perhaps the Judges of King’s Bench thought the construction ought to be on the letter of 
attorney itself without such evidence.  In this Court it is otherwise.”52  In support of the 
injunction, Hardwicke explained that, “Four witnesses who are conversant in buying and selling 
Navy bills swear they should not have scrupled to have purchased under this letter of attorney.”53 
During Lord Mansfield=s years as Chief Justice of King’s Bench, the question of whether 
evidence could be given to the jury on the custom of merchants arose in a variety of commercial 
contexts.  Such evidence was not allowed if the custom either contradicted or corroborated an 
established rule of law (in the latter case because there would be no question of fact for the jury 
 
50 Thomas Ley MSS, Misc. MS 196, fol. 8, Inner Temple Library, London. 
 
51 Ibid. 
 
52 Ambler, 186. 
 
53  Thomas Ley MSS, Misc. MS 196, fol. 8, Inner Temple Library, London.  See also 
Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252 (1755), involving the question whether a factor could retain 
goods consigned to him by his principal, against the balance owing the factor on his account.  
Four merchants were examined by deposition, and after argument at the bar, Lord Hardwicke 
adjourned the cause so that “the four merchants . . . might attend in court, in order to be 
consulted by him upon the point.”  Ibid., 253.  They attended on the appointed day, and 
Hardwicke “asked them several questions upon the custom and usage of merchants relating to 
the matter in doubt,” after which “his Lordship gave his opinion with great clearness,” 
incorporating the information that had been supplied by the merchants. Ibid., 254-56. 
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to decide).54  But if the question in dispute had not been clearly established as a matter of law in 
prior cases, the testimony would be permissible.55 
When acting as special jurors, the merchants called upon their own experience and 
knowledge in reaching their verdicts.  As Lord Mansfield famously remarked in Lewis v. Rucker: 
“The special jury, (amongst whom there are many knowing and considerable Merchants)   
. . . understood the Question very well, and knew more of the Subject of it than any Body 
else present; and formed their Judgment from their own Notions and Experience without 
much Assistance from anything that passed.”56 
 
Of course the fact that a special jury of merchants had been empaneled did not mean that 
testimonial evidence on the custom of merchants as applicable to a given case was unnecessary. 
It would not have been feasible to insure that the expertise of the merchant jurors would match 
the issue being litigated,57 though, as apparently was true in Lewis v. Rucker, this could happen.   
Another example is the case of Carvick v. Vickery, which, according to Lord Mansfield, 
involved a general question of great importance, “Whether an undertaking, by a bill of exchange, 
to pay A. and B. is an undertaking to pay A. or B.”  Mansfield nonsuited the plaintiff at the trial 
because only one of the payees had indorsed the bill.58  After argument, the full court granted a 
 
54 See, e.g., Edie v. East India Company, 2 Burr. 1216 (1761); Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 
1516 (1764). 
 
55 For a cogent discussion of cases on point, see W.D. Evans, A General View of the  
Decisions of Lord Mansfield in Civil Causes, 2 vols. (1803), II: 232-43, and in particular n. (m). 
 
56 2 Burr. 1167, 1168 (1761).   
 
57 See, e.g., Bolland v.  Barret (The Times, March 2, 1793, p. 3), involving the sale of 
India cottons.  Despite the presence of a special jury of merchants, “several witnesses were 
called to prove, that by the custom of the trade, the phrase with all faults only applied to 
accidental holes, rents, and discolourations, but that the term did not extend to rotten; so that . . . 
rottenness was not a fault.” 
58 2 Doug. 653 (1783). 
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new trial, which came on in March 1783 before Lord Mansfield and a special jury.  Counsel for 
the defendant offered to prove “that, by the universal usage and understanding of all the bankers 
and merchants in London, the indorsement was bad, because not signed by both the payees.”59  
Counsel for the plaintiff objected, because “the point was a question of law, and had been 
decided by the court.”  Lord Mansfield overruled the objection since he did not think the 
question had been decided so as to preclude the evidence.  Counsel for the plaintiff “then called 
Mr. Gosling, an eminent banker, to prove the usage; but the jury, unâ voce, declared that they 
knew it perfectly to be as he [counsel] had stated it; and, without hearing the witness, found a 
verdict for the defendant.”60 
The judges recognized that in business disputes the merchant jurors brought to the 
courtroom valuable expertise.  Indeed, at times, the judges confessed their own limitations.  A 
good example across the years directly applicable to the Seventh Amendment historical test is 
the trial conduct of Lord Mansfield’s successor, Lloyd Kenyon, Chief Justice of the Court of 
King’s Bench from 1788 to 1802.  Most of the time Kenyon was outspokenly self-confident in 
presiding over jury trials,61 but by his own admission, he was often very much at sea in marine 
 
59 Ibid., 654. 
 
60 Ibid.  There were, nevertheless, some limits on the behavior of the merchant jurors.  In 
the insurance case of Leftkin v. Hofthman (The Times, July 19, 1797, p. 3), counsel Erskine was 
examining his witnesses on behalf of the defendant, when “Mr. Dunnage, senior, one of the 
Gentlemen of the jury, got up and said, this was as legal a Policy of Insurance as ever was 
underwritten.”  Lord Kenyon interposed, “It is a great misfortune when any Gentleman of the 
Jury makes up his mind on a cause before it is finished,@ noting that it was not the first time he 
had made such an observation.  Erskine added: “And on the same Gentleman.”  Kenyon then 
lectured the jury of merchants about their proper role, after which Mr. Dunnage apologized. 
61 See, e.g., Johnstone v. Sheddon, reported in The Times, October 16, 1800, p. 3.  The 
issue in this insurance case was whether to use the contract price or the market price for damaged 
goods, and there was heavy reliance on Lord Mansfield=s decision in Lewis v. Rucker. The 
plaintiff=s only witness was a Mr. Oliphant who “had attended very frequently on Special Juries,” 
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insurance cases and on questions of navigation. 
Marine insurance policies invariably used the standard printed form that had been in 
place with Lloyds of London since the late 17th century.  This was a curious one-page form with 
an astonishing lack of clarity.  Judges and practitioners regularly complained about it, but to little 
effect.  According to the official historians of Lloyds:   
“Short as it is, this form contains a good deal of tautology; blanks that no on ever dreams 
of filling up; clauses, superfluous to most insurances, that no one ever troubles to strike 
out.  It leaves many of the contingencies of modern commerce wholly unprovided for; yet 
purports to give assurance against risks that are now uninsurable, or the subject of special 
contracts.  These defects and omissions are made good by additional clauses, written, 
stamped, or gummed on the policy, which explain, amplify, and frequently contradict the 
terms of the policy itself.  These additional clauses are often printed and gummed on in 
batches, including many that are entirely irrelevant to the particular transaction in 
question.”62 
 
Historians Wright and Fayle explained that if the standard language of the Lloyds policy had not 
been retained, Athen the leading cases decided on the old form would cease to be binding 
precedents, and the moment a dispute arose the whole business of litigation would begin again@; 
therefore, “the body of the policy has long been regarded as sacrosanct.”63 
 
and “had been in the constant habit of settling average losses.”  Counsel for the defendant, 
Vicary Gibbs, observed that on the facts before the court, calculating the loss “was rather an 
intricate question,” but Lord Kenyon said “he could find no intricacy in it” – “what Mr. Oliphant 
had said was as clear as the sun.@  (It may have been as clear as the sun to Lord Kenyon, but it 
was not so clear to his brother judges.  A motion for new trial was argued in Easter term 1801, 
but the judgment of the court was not issued until Trinity term 1802.  Kenyon died in April 1802 
and was succeeded by Edward Law, Lord Ellenborough, who recused himself from the case.  
The court=s opinion was delivered by Justice Lawrence, ordering a new trial after concluding that 
Mr. Oliphant=s calculation was wrong.  See 2 East 580, 581.) 
 
62 Charles Wright and C. Ernest Fayle, A History of Lloyds From the Founding of Lloyds 
Coffee House to the Present Day (1928): 126.  See generally J. Oldham, “Insurance Litigation 
Involving the Zong and Other British Slave Ships, 1780-1807,” Journal of Legal History 28 
(2007) 299, 300-03.  
63 Ibid., 155. 
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In a case that came before the House of Lords in 1754, Fitz-Gerald v. Pole,64 William 
Murray (who two years later would become Lord Mansfield) gave some background of the 
Lloyds policy in argument for the plaintiff.65  He explained as follows: 
“A very inaccurate form of this contract [the Lloyds policy] was anciently used among 
merchants, and drawn by themselves.  It was brought into England by persons who came 
from abroad, and settled in Lombard-Street; and the terms of it, though very imperfectly 
penned, having acquired a sense from the usage of merchants, the form is followed to this 
day, and every policy refers to those made in Lombard-Street.  Hence, contrary to the 
general rule, parol evidence is admitted to explain this contract, though in writing; and 
the words are controuled, or liberally supplied, by the intent of the agreement, the usage 
of merchants, and, above all, by judicial determinations, which are the strongest evidence 
of the received law of merchants.@66 
  
The incoherence of the standard Lloyds policy required the courts to rely upon the 
merchants to work out the meaning of particular cases. As quoted above, Lord Chancellor 
Hardwicke remarked in a 1753 case that, “Unless evidence of the usage be admitted on policies 
of insurance, they would be unintelligible.”67  Over the next half-century, things did not 
improve.  In a 1779 insurance action, Simond v. Boydell, Lord Mansfield commented on the 
Aancient form of a policy of insurance, which is still retained,” calling it “in itself, very 
inaccurate,” and adding: “It is amazing when additional clauses are introduced, that the 
 
64 4 Bro. P.C. 439 (1754).  
 
65 Murray and Hume Campbell represented the plaintiff, an underwriter of an insurance 
policy on the ship Goodfellow.  Brown=s report of the case does not specify whether Murray or 
Campbell was speaking, but given the content of the argument, there is no doubt that it was 
Murray, who was at the time Solicitor General and would have been lead counsel. 
 
66 Ibid., 444. 
 
67 Macklish v. Ekins, text at n. 46, above.  See also Baker v. Paine, 1 Vesey Sr. 456, 459 
(1750) (Lord Chancellor Hardwicke: “On mercantile contracts relating to insurances, &c. courts 
of law examine and hear witnesses, of what is the usage and understanding of merchants 
conversant therein: for they have a style peculiar to themselves, which is short, yet is understood 
by them; and must be the rule of construction.”) 
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merchants do not take some advice in framing them, or bestow more consideration upon them 
themselves.  I do not recollect an addition made which has not created doubts on the construction 
of it.”68  And in Rucker v. Allnutt (1812), Lord Ellenborough began his opinion with the 
following gloomy description of the Lloyds policy: “A painful and anxious duty is cast upon the 
Court to construe an instrument, contradictory and redundant in some of its expressions, and 
penurious in others of them; the obscurity of which arises partly from the imperfection of the 
language of those who execute it, and partly from the extraordinary and novel risks meant to be 
covered by it.”69 
In the 1791 case of Brough v. Whitmore, the insurance policy on an East India and China 
ship covered “the tackle, ordnance, ammunition, artillery, and furniture of the ship.”70 The stores  
and provisions for the ship had accidentally burned up while in a warehouse during ship repairs, 
and the issue was whether the provisions, which were intended for the use of the ship’s crew, 
were covered under the policy. At the trial before Lord Kenyon, a member of the special jury 
said “that it had been determined in Lord Mansfield=s time that they [the provisions] were 
included under the word ‘furniture,’” and that the merchants in the city had since acquiesced in 
that view.   After argument before the full court on a motion for new trial, Lord Kenyon 
reflected: “On the trial of this cause, I had nothing to guide my judgment on the construction of 
this instrument but the words of the policy; and when it was stated that ‘provisions’ were 
included in the word ‘furniture,’ I confess I was somewhat at a loss to know to what extent the 
 
68 1 Doug. 268, 270-71. 
 
69 15 East 278, 283 (1812).   
70 4 T.R. 206 (1791).  
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underwriters were liable on words so indefinite as these which are used.”71  He mused that the 
rule of law ought to be given by the court and not by merchants, “though, when a question arises 
on the construction of the words of an instrument, which are in themselves ambiguous, it is a 
matter fairly within the province of those who alone act upon such instruments to declare the 
meaning of them,” and it was only by Athe uniform practice of merchants and underwriters@ that 
the policies had been rendered Aintelligible.@72 The court upheld the special jury=s finding that the 
provisions were covered by the word “furniture.”  Justice Buller opened his concurring opinion 
by observing that “a policy of assurance has at all times been considered in courts of law as an 
absurd and incoherent instrument; but it is founded on usage, and must be governed and 
construed by usage.”73   
One of the standard provisions in the printed Lloyds policy stated that specified 
perishable commodities were warranted free from various percentages of loss unless “the Ship be 
stranded.”74  What exactly constituted a “stranding” became the subject of litigation before Lord 
Kenyon and multiple special juries.75  The case of Burnett v. Kensington occupied four jury trials 
on the question.76  The second trial, as reported in The Times, sharply illustrates the unreality of 
continuing to apply the Seventh Amendment historical test to cases that would have been 
 
71 Ibid., 208.   
 
72 Ibid., 208-09.  
 
73 Ibid., 210.  
74 See Wright and Fayle, supra n. 62, illustration facing p. 148 (reproducing a 1794 
policy on slave cargo -- see the “N.B.” at the bottom). 
 
75 See, e.g., Baurin v. Elmslie, The Times, July 15, 1790, p. 3 (described in Burnett v. 
Kensington, 7 T.R. 210, 214 as Bowring v. Elmslie). 
 
76 7 T.R. 211 (1797), reporting the argument on the case reserved after the fourth trial. 
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decided in England by merchant juries -- juries that are no longer lawful in federal courts in the 
United States.  The second Burnett trial came before Lord Kenyon and a special jury of 
merchants.  In addressing the jury, Kenyon said that Athere was one point which he would not 
reserve for the consideration of the Court, but for the meaning of which he would put himself 
upon the country; and, therefore, upon the great question in this cause, he would request the 
assistance of the Jury, to tell him what was meant by the word STRANDING.”77   
To “put oneself upon the country” was the standard expression for requesting a jury trial.  
Kenyon, however, certainly would not have used this expression if a common jury had been 
empaneled -- what he sought was the collective opinions of the merchants in the jury box.  Later, 
in the decision following the fourth trial in the Burnett case, Lord Kenyon mentioned the 
argument that had been advanced by counsel after the first trial, “that what was a stranding was a 
question of law,” and Kenyon said that “he had left it to the jury, not on a matter of law, but as to 
what was the meaning among merchants of a mercantile word in a mercantile instrument.”78 
Lord Kenyon relied on the merchant jurors both for his own guidance and for the 
guidance of the commercial world at large.  In the 1794 insurance case of Cambden v. Ewer, 
Kenyon said that, “In great commercial cases . . . he always formed his opinion with 
considerable diffidence, but, if there was any mistake in it, he was sure it would be corrected, 
when submitted to a jury of merchants of the city of London.”79  In Thwaits v. Angerstein, 
Kenyon Aprofessed himself totally ignorant of navigation, except in so far as he had learned it 
from his apprenticeship in his judicial office.  He had received a great deal of information from 
 
77 The Times, March 28, 1796, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
78 7 T.R. at 212. 
 
79 The Times, June 19, 1794, p. 3. 
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the different classes of merchants by whom he had had the honour of being assisted in the 
administration of justice.@80    
In addition to merchant jurors, as noted earlier, Lord Kenyon also got help from 
assessors.  Thus in Casey v. Donald, a negligence case involving a ship collision, Kenyon 
confessed that, “I am totally incapable of judging questions of this kind,” but “I do not rely on 
my own opinion; for I have conversed with the two respectable Gentlemen who sit by me. 
[These were two of the Elder Brethren of the Trinity-House, who were assessors to his Lordship, 
to give him any information with respect to the navigation.]”81 
Finally, the case of Case v. Grice was described in the report in The Times as “of 
immense importance to the Commercial World.”82  This case brings into sharp relief the fact that 
the courts relied, not on the ordinary run of common jurors, but on the expertise of merchant 
jurors.  The owners of the slave ship Cyclops sued the Captain for mismanagement, claiming that 
he had caused the ship, with 432 slaves on board, to be captured by a French schooner off the 
coast of Jamaica.  Reportedly when the French schooner approached, the crew of 24 men 
prepared to resist, but the Captain laughed at them, stating derisively, “Are you going to fight for 
a parcel of d___d rascally Underwriters?  If you lose a leg or an arm, would they replace it or 
maintain you?@  In his address to the jury of merchants, Lord Kenyon admonished, Athat from the 
Verdict of a Jury in London, sitting in the Guildhall of the City, those who were entrusted with 
the interests of individuals and of the Public, were to learn how far they were obliged to exert 
their utmost endeavours, or how far they were to be sheltered when their utmost endeavours had 
 
80 The Times, November 14, 1798, p. 3. 
 
81 The Times, December 18, 1799, p. 3.  See also n. 36, above, and accompanying text. 
82 The Times, December 16, 1796, p. 2. 
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not been exerted for their employers.”  Further, 
“The question, he said, was, whether the Jury would permit it to go forth out of that  
Court, that a Captain circumstanced like the present Defendant, was justified in 
surrendering his ship without firing a single gun.  That was the question, and for 
any thing he knew, every Captain engaged in the private trade of the kingdom, 
as well as those who commanded our ships of war in various parts of the globe, 
would act upon the Verdict which the Jury should in this case give.  That was the 
question to be answered by the Merchants of the City of London.” 
 
 Conclusion: Apples and Oranges 
For complex civil cases, the historical test for the scope of the Seventh Amendment jury 
trial guarantee has become an exercise in comparing apples to oranges.  We are told to compare 
the current civil case in which a jury has been requested to the litigation in the common law 
courts of England in 1791 to see whether a jury would have been empaneled then in a 
comparable case.  The first step is to see whether there were any comparable common law cases 
in England in 1791.  As we have seen, some of the cases that were then considered complex -- 
accounting cases, for example -- were decided in Chancery, never reaching the common law 
courts.  Others were resolved by arbitration.  Some common law cases, however, could fairly be 
characterized as complex, such as those precipitated by bankruptcies of major financial houses.  
Would such cases have been tried by a jury?  A few of these cases, as has been shown, were 
decided on demurrer to the evidence, but otherwise the answer is yes.   
This, however, is an unsatisfactory stopping place.  Another question should be asked: 
What type of jury would have been empaneled?  As the discussion above has shown, these cases 
would almost certainly have been tried by special juries, and by the late eighteenth century, the 
special juries would have been filled mostly or entirely by merchants. 
If the function of the historical test is only to determine whether the plaintiff in the given 
case would have had in England in 1791 in a comparable case a right to a jury -- any jury -- then 
 
 27 
                                                
whether the jury would have been common or special presumably would not matter.  But if “the 
right to trial by jury” that was preserved by the Seventh Amendment meant the right to trial by 
jury as practiced in England in 1791, then the right to have a special jury should be taken into 
account.   
Just as trial by jury existed in the United States in 1791 in federal and state courts, so also 
did the right to a special jury.83  Because of the emergence in the twentieth century of the 
reasonable cross-section requirement, that right is now gone, and the historical test has to that 
extent become anachronistic.  Some might say that this is akin to the changes that brought 
women and minorities into the jury pools.  Obviously no one could insist that under the historical 
test, he or she would be entitled to an all-male jury.  The Seventh Amendment cannot be 
interpreted and applied in a manner that would violate other parts of the Constitution.  The 
Seventh Amendment, however, is a protection for the parties to a lawsuit, while the reasonable 
cross-section requirement protects a completely different interest -- the right of all citizens to 
have the opportunity to serve on juries.   
Carrying these thoughts forward to the extreme, one could argue that the Seventh 
Amendment protects the right of a litigant not to have a jury in a complex civil case, since the 
thing most desired in such a case in 1791 would have been expertise, and that expertise would 
have come from Masters in Chancery, arbitrators, special (merchant) jurors, or the judges 
themselves.  Yet in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English common law 
judges said over and over again that the merchant jurors knew more about the matters in 
litigation in commercial cases than the judges did.  Absent special jurors, and arbitration aside, 
 
83 For a special jury case decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1794, see 
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dallas 1 (1794), and see generally Trial by Jury, ch. 9. 
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comparable expertise in the United States today would reside in the judges and in expert 
witnesses.  It would not be likely to be found in a jury chosen from a jury pool shaped by the 
reasonable cross-section requirement. 
This reasoning, however, goes farther than is necessary in assessing the validity of a 
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment.  Such an exception need not be thought of as 
precluding trial by jury; the trial judge should have discretion to decide whether the case could 
be sensibly managed by a (common) jury.84   
In the end, the debate returns to the fundamental question: What right to trial by jury in 
suits at common law was preserved by the Seventh Amendment?  If a complex civil case in 1791 
in England would either not have gone to a jury at all or would have gone to a form of jury that is 
today unlawful (the jury of experts, the special jury of merchants), it follows that a complexity 
exception to the Seventh Amendment should be constitutionally unobjectionable. 
 
84 Note that in the Japanese Electronic Products case, the Third Circuit, though not 
wishing Ato pioneer@ in the use of history brought out in the argument about the Seventh 
Amendment, decided that the due process clause would have been violated if the case before the 
court had been allowed to go to a jury.  See Trial by Jury, 19. 
